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Abstract—Nowadays, the market of Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS) develops progressively with a lot of applications such
as: infrastructure monitoring, law enforcement, environment
research, goods transportation, etc. However, due to the lack of
human observation, communication capacities, and protection,
a UAS is an appropriate target for a criminal or a terrorist
cyber attack. Therefore, risks related to the cyber-security need
to be taken into account during the development of a UAS. This
document presents a risk management methodology related to
cyber-security. The expected result of the application of this
methodology is a list of cyber-security requirements which guides
the development of cyber-security countermeasures.
Index Terms—Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), cyber secu-
rity, risk management, cyber-security requirement
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have a wide
range of critical applications such as air intelligence, infras-
tructure monitoring, law enforcement, goods transportation,
etc. Actually, the safety and cyber-security levels of most
UASs do not correspond to their targeted usage. In order to
make UAS reach the safety level of a certificated aerospace
system, Sogilis company developed a software development
process according to the DO-178C standard (Software Con-
siderations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification).
In this study, we aim to add the cyber-security aspect to the
development process. The output of the cyber-security analysis
is used as the input of the development process. Our general
approach is presented in Figure 1.
In general, people in charge of security have to answer
some questions: “Have all the threats been identified?” or
“are these countermeasures all necessary?” [1]. In order to
answer these questions, the risk management could provide
a systematical and effective way to detect, analyze, evaluate
possible security loss and select adequate countermeasures to
mitigate its impact. Moreover, risk management could allow
security manager to balance operation vs. economic cost of
implementing security countermeasures [2].
To the best of our knowledge, most research related to
security of UAS focus on discovering and solving the indi-
vidual security issue such as GPS spoofing [3], [4], secure
communication [5], [6], sensor spoofing [7], [8], virus [9].
Through this study, we aim to treat the cyber-security issues
of UAS in the global view by developing a risk management
Fig. 1. General approach
methodology. The expected result of the application of this
methodology is a list of cyber-security requirements which will
be used to define the system requirements in the development
process.
The remaining of this document is organized as follows.
The background and related work on risk management in
both industry and research is presented in Section II. The
proposed methodology is then given in Section III. A study
case and the result of the application of the methodology is
given in Section IV. We conclude our works and present our
perspective on the future works in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
A. Incidents and researches related to cyber-security of UAS
Actually UASs are exposed to several cyber security risks.
There are many reports on cyber-security breach and re-
searches on attack simulation that show the importance of
cyber-security in the UAS development.
A GPS jamming attack was claimed as the cause of the crash
of S-100 Camcopter, a rotor based UAV, resulting in a dead
and two injured in 2012 [10]. Another attack related to GPS
spoofing was suspected of being executed in 2011, resulting
in the capture of RQ-170, a military UAS [11]. Several cases
of security violation by video interception on military are also
reported in the literature [12], [13]. It is quite surprising that
an off the shelf product of 26 dollars could be used to intercept
video data from a military UAS [13].
There are also a lot of research works on simulated cyber-
security attacks [8], [14]–[16]. These are especially important
because we can gain new knowledge about potential cyber-
security breaches. Therefore, we can reduce the security risk
on the UAV. Vattapparamban et al experimented several hijack
attacks by exploiting the vulnerabilities of Wifi communication
of three small unmanned aircraft vehicles (UAVs) [14]. Heiges
et al simulated two attack scenarios on a UAV [15]. The first
one is the malicious change of its flight plan, the second
one is the corruption of the on-board camera. Both were
executed by injecting fake commands into the autopilot. Son
et al succeeded to crash a drone by manipulating the normal
gyroscope behaviour. It was disturbed by sound waves at
the right resonant frequency which caused an unexpected
behaviour of the autopilot and therefore the drone crashed
[16]. Davidson et al argued that the optical flow sensors used
for navigation represent a vector for adversarial control [8]. In
order to demonstrate this argument, the authors experimented
on a real UAV.
To ensure the global cyber-security of UAS is a very chal-
lenging task. We reported a few examples of cyber-security
risks and their related attack methods but, unfortunately,
they evolve day by day. Therefore it is quite important to
develop new methodologies in order to improve the level of
UAV cyber-security even in the case of unknown or partially
unexpected attacks.
B. Related work in risk management
A risk management is a systematic and effective process to
deal with security risks. It could contain different activities:
risk identification, risk assessment, decision making for control
the risks. In this section, we present different methodologies,
methods are currently adopted in industry for the risk man-
agement. These methodologies/methods are used for varied
systems which are more or less similar to UAS such as
automobile, avionic, smart medical system and information
system.
ISO 27005 standard was first considered as a guidance
to information security risk management in an organization
[17]. Beyond the boundary of information security in an
organization, ISO/IEC 27005 is also referred as a guidance
to cyber security in cyber physical systems. This standard
constitutes a framework for risk management process rather
than providing a specific risk management method [1]. The
framework of ISO27005 is shown in Figure 2.
Failure Mode Vulnerability and Effect Analysis
(FMVEA) [18] is a risk assessment for both security and
dependability, which is extended from Failure Mode Effect
Analysis (FMEA). In order to identify the security risks, the
author firstly identifies the possible attacks against components
of protected system then define the impact of the component
failures on the system. But the author does not detail how the
attacks are identified.
Fig. 2. An information security risk management process from ISO/IEC
27005:2011 [17]
Attack tree [19] is an inductive risk assessment method.
This method is commonly used in different security domains
(automobile [20], smart health [21], industrial control system
(ICS) [22]). The attack tree method describes the attacks on a
system by first identifying the goal of the attack as a root node
of a tree. The way the adversary reaches this goal interactively
and incrementally is expressed as child nodes in the tree. Each
path in the attack tree from the leaf node (or a set of leaf nodes)
to the root node describes a unique attack on the system [21].
E-safety Vehicle Intrusion proTected Applications
(EVITA) [23] [20] is a research program in automotive
industry. This project presented a risk management method-
ology dedicated automobile on-board network. The aim of
this methodology is to define a list of security requirement
to design and verify security solutions, which is similar to our
purpose.
Method for Harmonized Analysis of Risk (MEHARI) is
a risk management methodology for information security of
an organization. In this methodology, the risks are reasoned
based on analyzing the possible malfunction of different
functionalities, then they are evaluated and treated based on the
supporting tools of MEHARI. Because MEHARI is designed
to control the information security risks of an organization,
this is not suitable for other domain such as security of UAS.
However the strategy to identify the risks could be useful for
UAS risk management.
ED202A/DO326 is a guidance for airworthiness security
process. The objective of this document is to add new pro-
cesses to handle the risk of intentional unauthorized electronic
to the current process of aircraft development and certification
[24]. For this purpose, this document provides a security
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risk management methodology compliant with ISO 27005
standard.
Specific Operation Risk Assessment (SORA) is a risk
assessment methodology dedicated to UAS application. This
methodology focuses on evaluating only the safety level of an
operation. This factor is qualitatively estimated based on the
likelihood that the occurrence “Out of control of operation”
could lead to injuries of people on ground, collisions with
other aircrafts, and damage infrastructures on ground. Based
on this factor, the applicant could chose appropriate mitigation
solutions with their level of robustness.
Through our study in the state of the art, we find that
it lacks a risk management methodology for the UAS de-
velopment. The methodologies the closest to our application
are ED202A/DO326A and SORA. Designed as a part of the
civil aircraft development, ED202A /DO326A is too complex
to be integrated into our development process while SORA
focuses only on evaluating the safety of a UAS operation.
Therefore, this research is intended to propose a risk manage-
ment methodology which is dedicated to UAS security, simple
enough to implement and capable to ensure more or less the
completeness of the protection.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
OF UAS
By inspiring methodologies existing in other domains, es-
pecially the ones listed in the last section, we developed a
simple risk management methodology dedicated to UAS de-
velopment. The methodology includes four principal activities:
“Context establishment”, “Risk identification”, “Risk analysis
and evaluation” and “Treatment” as shown in Figure 3. In
the Context establishment activity, we propose a method to
collect and arrange all the information on the situation, on the
protected system, which define the scope of risk management.
For the Risk identification activity, we propose a method to
identify the possible security risks based on the attack tree
method and the malfunction analysis. The Risk analysis and
evaluation activity is to define the priority of each defined
risk. The risk with the highest priority needs to be treated first
with robust solutions. The last one, Treatment is to define the
security requirements, which are used to design, verify security
solutions. These activities are described with more details in
the remaining of this section.
A. Context establishment
In this methodology, the context establishment (activity A)
aims to prepare necessary information for the next analysis
in the risk assessment activity. This activity includes the
following steps:
• Operation description
• System under consideration description
1) Operation description: This step aims to describe as
detailed as possible the objective and process which the
deployed system needs to achieve in the point of view of
Fig. 3. Work-flow of the proposed methodology
operators. For this purpose, we utilize the guideline of JARUS-
SORA [25] for collecting and presenting operation information
as follows:
• Detailed description containing all information to get
understanding of how, where, and under which limitations
or conditions the drone is deployed.
• Detailed description containing all information about the
type of operation such as (Visual Line Of Sight or Beyond
Line Of Sight) and the level of involvement of operators
or levels of automation of the drone during the flight.
• Detailed description about the processes of system de-
ployment and maintenance as well as the people involved
in these processes
• Detailed description about contingency procedures in
place for any malfunctions or emergency cases (e.g. run
out of battery, loss of connection).
• Several cyber-security assumptions about the system un-
der consideration, the environment that allows to reduce
the scope of analysis and neglect several kinds of attacks.
For instance, an assumption could be that all staffs
are trusted so that all attacks launched intentionally by
internal staffs is neglected.
Note 1: From this description, several informations could
be extracted such as functions that the system needs to be
achieved (e.g. following a specific trajectory, sending video
back to the Ground Control Station - GCS), reference factors
used to analyze the severity of impact (e.g. number of deaths in
case of the operation that a drone flies over a crowd, financial
loss in case of operation that a drone transports goods).
Note 2: The cyber-security assumptions need to be identified
carefully; if not, potential attacks could be neglected.
2) System under consideration description: The purpose
of this step is to obtain the necessary knowledge about
the protected system. This step focus on collecting several
kinds of information: architecture, cyber-security environment,
interface, function.
• Architecture: a system could be decomposed into small
components. These elements and their interconnections
should be identified.
• Environment: all people, external systems which could
interact with system under consideration. For instance,
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in case of a UAS, cyber-security environment could be
maintenance personnel, manufacture, Internet, operators,
etc. For each element of environment, their capabilities
of access and roles need to be detailed.
• Interface: all entry points that elements of environment
could interact with the system. For example, in case of
a drone, the ground control station sends command data
to the drone via RF communication, therefore the RF
communication is an interface of the drone.
• Functions: all discrete actions (described by action verbs)
necessary to achieve the systems objectives. The infor-
mation on system functions could be deduced from the
system operation information. The information on the
component functions could be deduced from its output
which is presented in the architecture. For example in
case of a drone, the system function could be following
a pre-determined trajectory, recording and sending video
back to the ground station. In the function description,
it should also detail requirements for this function. For
example, for “sending video back to the ground station”
function, it should detail intended quality of video, con-
fidentiality of video data, etc.
A UAS is a complex system combined by many components
such as autopilot, GPS, RF module, camera. Each component
has also its own architecture, function, interface, environment.
Therefore, all mentioned information should be collected in
many abstract levels. For example, beside of architecture,
interface, function, cyber-security environment of the UAS,
we need to know the ones of autopilot, RF module, camera,
etc.
Note: Depending on the process of development (design,
test, documentation) and the status of the system (under
development or ready to use), these information could exist
(documented) or not. In case they do not exist, they should
be deduced from existing information in the way that ensures
the completeness and the logic of information.
B. Risk identification
In the risk identification step, we aims to achieve three
objectives. The first objective is to identify as exhaustively
as possible risks. The second one is to bring to light the
nature of the risks and their evolution (including basic action
of attackers, malfunctions in components at different abstract
levels and a malfunction at the system level). The last one is to
facilitate the security requirement selection. For this purpose,
this methodology adopts a new version of the attack tree for
this step. The process for building attack trees is shown in
Figure 4.
Firstly, each attack tree starts with a malfunction of the
system at the highest abstract level, as a root node that
presents the goal of attack (for example, “crash of drone”
or “disclosure of the observation video”). These malfunctions
could be directly deduced from desired functions of system
identified in the context establishment. Each malfunction is
considered as the loss of one of three security attributes
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) see Table I.
Fig. 4. Attack tree construction work-flow
TABLE I
MALFUNCTIONS DUE TO LOSS OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
Security attributes Malfunction description
Availability Malfunction presenting the denial of access to thefunction
Integrity Malfunction presenting the misuse or the in-correctionof the function
Confidentiality Malfunction presenting the disclosure ofinformation/data
For example, in regard to “fly and follow a pre-determined
trajectory” function, we can identify two malfunctions of
drone: crash (loss of availability) and divergence from pre-
determined trajectory - following the trajectory defined by
attackers (loss of integrity).
Next, malfunctions in components contributing to root mal-
function is deduced and expressed as child nodes of the attack
tree that presents sub goals of the attack (e.g. the autopilot
provide incorrect command to the motors). In order to deduce
the malfunction of components, we use lists of component
functions and architectures as inputs.
For example, “crash of drone” is a malfunction at the
highest level and assigned as a root node. This malfunction
is related to “fly following a pre-determined trajectory” func-
tion. This system function is achieved by several component
functions:
• Autopilot: provide motor command
• GPS: providing position data
• Inertial measurement unit (IMU): providing attitude data.
Therefore the child nodes of “crash of drone” could be
“GPS provide incorrect position data”, “GPS unable to
provide position data”, “autopilot unable to control aircraft”,
etc.
Then this process is repeated for identifying causes of the
malfunction of the sub-systems until reaching the lowest level
elements (where information is available). Lastly, the attack
tree ends with leaf nodes expressing malicious actions or
attack methods that could be launched by an attacker for
triggering attacks. These malicious actions could be deduced
from information about interface, environment.
After being finished, the attack trees give us a visual
presentation about the whole of risks related to a system
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function. Each path from leaf node to root node expresses
an attack scenario that attackers could carry out. Each attack
scenario is a cyber-security risk which we need to be evaluated
in the next steps. Because the process of building attack trees is
deductive, the result is more or less influenced by the capacity
of the person who performs the analysis. Therefore, at the end,
the completeness of result needs to be verified by checking
if all documented attack methods have been identified in the
attack trees.
Note: During deduction process, however some malfunc-
tions/vulnerabilities are considered as very difficult to occur,
they should be kept on the attack tree if the link between
them and higher malfunctions/ malicious action is logic. For
example, “flashing GPS with malware via its USB port” is
difficult to occur but could happen, so that it needs to be
shown in the attack tree.
C. Risk analysis and evaluation
This step aims to determine which attack scenario needs to
be considered and which one could be neglected. The basic
idea in this step is similar to the one in safety analysis where
the level risk is characterized by two factors: the likelihood and
the severity of impact. However, the likelihood of an attack
is difficult to determine due to the lack of feedback. Instead
of likelihood, we evaluate the difficulty of attack (DOA),
which express the total effort an attacker needs to carry out a
successful attack. The attacks which are easy to perform but
could give a major impact, should be treated first. The attacks
which are difficult to perform and have a minor impact, could
be neglected or treated with low priority. Table II shows the
mechanics used to decide the risk level of each attack scenario
(L, M, H denote representatively Low, Medium and High risk
level).
TABLE II
RISK LEVEL
DOA
None L M M H H
Basic L L M M H
Moderate L L L M M
High L L L L M
Very High L L L L L
No Impact Low Medium Strong Very Strong
Severity of attack
In this methodology, the difficulty of each attack and the
severity of impacts are evaluated qualitatively by more than
one person. The severity of attack could be reasoned from
operation information collected in the context establishment
activity. The difficulty of an attack could be evaluated based
on the nature of necessary equipment (e.g. cheap or expensive,
popular or not), the necessary knowledge of attack techniques
and systems to carry out the attack.
In the context of aerospace industry, we adopt the attack
difficulty scales proposed in ED203 [26] - the guideline
document of ED202A/DO326. The difficulty of each attack
is firstly measured in range from 0 to 30 points then is
represented in 5 level scale (None, Basis, Moderate, High and
very High) as shown in Table III.
TABLE III
DIFFICULTY OF ATTACK SCALE
From 0 to 6 From 7 to 12 From 13 to 18 From 19 to 24 From 25 to 30
None Basic Moderate High Very High
The difficulty of attack is determined by three criteria:
“Preparation Means”, “Execution Mean” and “Windows of
Opportunity”. The final difficulty point of each attack is equal
to the sum of points for these criteria. Tables IV, V, VI are
used as evaluation tools.
TABLE IV
PREPARATION MEANS
Knowledge
Equipment
None/Public
information and
no preparation
time
Uncontrolled
information
and no signification
preparation time
Insider Knowledge
or Significant
preparation
time
None/Standard1 0 2 6
Special COTS2 0 2 6
Special3 N/A 4 6
Bespoke4 N/A 5 6
TABLE V
WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY
Points Description
0 The attack can be carried out at any time
1 The attack can be carried out during regular cruise flight.
2 The attack vector is available while the aircraft is on the ground.
3 Maximum effectiveness for mandatory operational procedureslimiting the window of opportunity.
6 The attack vector is only available in a restricted time phase,e.g. on the ground in maintenance mode
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The attack can only be carried out during a very restricted
time slot independent from the flight phase (e.g. during system
reboot).
TABLE VI
EXECUTION MEANS
Expertise
Equipment
Layman Proficient Expert Multi Expert
None/Standard 0 2 6 10
Special COTS 0 2 6 10
Special N/A 4 6 12
Bespoke N/A 5 6 12
This analysis is qualitative and strongly based on the ex-
perience/knowledge of the applicants. We know that this can
be somehow a limitation of our approach because quantitative
assessments are to be preferred from the engineer perspective.
We hope to be able to improve this in the future.
D. Treatment
For each threat scenario selected for treating in the previous
step, a set of cyber-security requirements should be estab-
lished. A cyber-security requirement is not a specific security
1No equipment or something commonly already found
2Something which can be readily bought, but which is usually not yet in
the possession of an average person
3Something which cannot be readily bought, but which needs to be
assembled/built
4Special equipment which requires a bit amount of resources to assemble
5
measure, but it is only a security objective that needs to be
fulfilled to ensure the cyber-security of the system. For each
cyber-security requirement, one or more security measures
could be considered. They need to be tested/simulated and
evaluated (cost, effectiveness) before being selected for wiring
down system requirements.
In this methodology, we adopt the classification of security
requirement mentioned in ED202A/DO326A [26] as follows:
• Preventive: The aim is to discourage a malicious user
from causing a malfunction
• Deterrent: The aim is to prevent an occurrence of a
malfunction
• Detective: The aim is to detect and report a malfunction
or malicious action of an attacker.
• Corrective: the aim is to react to a malfunction when it
occurs
• Restorative: the aim is to put the system back to the
normal status after a malfunction
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, we present the application of our method-
ology for a case study, in which a UAS is used to observe a
highway in auto flight mode. The video captured by the UAV
and the flight information are sent to ground and displayed
to operators on the screens of Ground Control Station (GCS)
computers. During the operation, the UAV will fly and follow
a pre-defined trajectory alongside the highway. From the start
to the end of the flight, the UAV flies all the time in automatic
mode under Beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) observation of op-
erators. The operators could use three simple commands: start
the flight, end the flight (back to stand-by mode) and go home.
The architecture of this UAS is shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Architecture of a UAS.
From the description of the system operation, we defined
four system functions which need to be protected:
• Function 1: Fly the vehicle following automatically
a pre-determined trajectory: The drone must follow a
flight plan predetermined by manufacturer and embedded
in the autopilot. A flight plan contains several way-points.
Each way-point contains information on coordinates, al-
titude in reference to sea level or ground level.
• Function 2: Provide flight information to operators:
all status informations such as attitude, position, pre-
determined trajectory, battery information will be sent
to the ground and displayed on the screen of the GCS
computer. Only operators in charge have right to access
these informations.
• Function 3: Provide observation video to Operators:
the video captured by camera is sent to the ground and
displayed on the screen of GCS computer. Only operators
in charge have right to access these informations.
Based on the system functions above, we define malfunc-
tions which the attacker want to trigger. Each malfunction is
related to the loss of one cyber-security attribute (integrity,
avaibility, confidentiality) of a system function. The list of
malfunctions is presented as follows:
• Malfunction 1 Availability - Crash of UAV: Due to
malicious action, the UAV losses its attitude and crashes.
Because of flying over a highway, the crash of the UAV
could cause a lethal accident.
• Malfunction 1 Integrity - Deviation from trajectory:
Under an attack, the UAV deviates from its trajectory
and flies following the trajectory defined by attacker.
• Malfunction 1 Confidentiality - No relevant.
• Malfunction 2 Availability - Unavailability of flight
information: Under an attack, the flight information is
no more available and the operators could not recognize
the situation. This malfunction could help attacker launch
other attacks or makes the operation be canceled.
• Malfunction 2 Integrity - Fake flight information: Un-
der an attack, the fake flight information is provided to
operators which makes them make incorrect decisions.
• Malfunction 2 Confidentiality - Disclosure of flight
information: Under an attack, the attacker could gain
unauthorized access to the flight information, which could
help the attacker launch other attacks.
• Malfunction 3 Availability - Unavailability of video:
Under an attack, the operators could not access to the
observation video.
• Malfunction 3 Integrity - Fake video: Under an attack,
the operators receive the fake observation video made
by attacker. This malfunction do not impact directly the
safety of the operation, but it makes the objective of
operation totally failed.
• Malfunction 3 Confidentiality - Disclosure of video:
Under an attack, the attacker could gain unauthorized
access to observation video which impacts on the privacy
of the observed people.
For each aforementioned malfunction, we build an attack tree,
in which the malfunctions of system are decomposed into the
malfunctions of components. The ADTool [27] was used to
draw attack-trees. For example, the malfunction 2 Integrity
“Fake flight information” attack tree is presented in Figure 6.
Through the attack tree ”Fake flight information”, we define
four possible attack scenarios. Because the fake flight infor-
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Fig. 6. The complete attack tree expressing the ways of which attacker deceive
operator with the fake information - Malfunction 2 Integrity
TABLE VII
Malfunction Attacksenario
DOA Severity LevelPrepare Opportunity Execution Total
Provide
fake flight
information
1 2 1 2 None(4) Strong High
2 4 3 6 Moderate(13) Strong Medium
3 4 3 6 Moderate(13) Strong Medium
4 4 6 6 Moderate(16) Strong Medium
mation could lead to serious accidents, we consider that the
severity of the defined attack scenarios is at “‘strong” level.
The evaluation of these attack scenarios is shown in Table VII.
Based on the nature of the nodes of the attack tree, we define
different cyber-security requirements as shown in Figure 7.
These requirements will be implemented in order of risk level
of related attack scenarios.
• Requirement 7: During autopilot software update, the
autopilot shall verify the integrity of firmware.
• Requirement 8: Autopilot shall allow only manufacture
to flash its memory and shall verify the authentication of
manufacture identification.
• Requirement 14: Whenever receiving a packet, the RF
module shall verify that this packet is original from one
of its paired RF module. The fake packet shall be rejected.
• Requirement 15: Whenever receiving a packet, the RF
module shall verify the integrity of the packet in term of
time, payload and the origin.
• Requirement 20: Whenever receiving a packet from RF
module, the GCS computer shall verify that this packet
is generated by its autopilot.
• Requirement 21: The GCS shall verify and ensure the
integrity of the map and the flight plan store in GCS
computer.
• Requirement 24: The access to the connection port of
GCS computer should be limited to only the authorized
people by using both software and hardware solutions.
Fig. 7. “Fake information to ground” attack tree with security requirements
Totally, for this study case, we build 6 attack trees. In
these attack trees, we list all possible attack methods (leaf
nodes) mentioned in the literature of UAS (real attack, test,
or simulation). However, it is not enough to make our anal-
ysis exhaustive, because the information on real/new attack
methods is rarely published. In order to ensure the coverage
of all risks, instead of attack methods, we focus on identifying
exhaustively malfunction of system/component which could be
deduced from the available information on our system. Once
the cyber-security requirements for a malfunction is deployed,
we could protect the system against not only identified attack
methods but also some unknown related to this malfunction.
For example, there could be more than one attack method
which could lead to the malfunction “RF module provide
fake information to GCS”. By introducing the cyber-security
requirement 20, we could cover also the unknown attack
methods that lead to this malfunction (see Figure 7).
As a result, at the end, we establish totally 24 cyber-security
requirements. For each path from a leaf node to the root
of attack trees, we always have at least one cyber-security
requirement. Therefore, all risks identified in our attack trees
are taken into account. However, most of the requirements
are detective. In order to strengthen the cyber-security of
the system, the cyber-security requirements in other class
(corrective, restorative) should be added.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we develop a methodology of risk management
in order to integrate a cyber-security approach into the UAS
development process of Sogilis Company. Our methodology
consists of four activities: collecting the knowledge in the
system, identifying risks, judging risk priorities, and establish
cyber-security requirements. In order to illustrate our method-
ology, we present a study-case based on a UAS
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Presently, our methodology has both advantages and limita-
tions. An advantage is that it helps improve the completeness
of the protection. Traditionally, we needs to identify exhaus-
tively the ways that an attacker could penalize the system,
however the task is impossible because the attack method
always evolves and the result depends on the capacity of the
analysts. Therefore, it’s difficult to protect the system from the
new/unknown attacks. Instead of that, we focus on identifying
exhaustively the possible malfunctions of system/component
triggered by an attacker. This task is feasible because the
malfunctions could be deduced from the nature of the system
which is stable and well documented. The other advantage is
that this work is dedicated to UAS application. The limitation
of this work is that it could only take into account the cyber-
security after the operation and system are defined. We believe
that the cyber-security risks should be also considered soon
in the phase of concept of operations (CONOPS) and initial
system description
As a part of the future work, firstly we attempt to extend our
methodology in order to take into account the cyber-security in
CONOPS and initial system description. Secondly, we attempt
to fulfill the gaps between our cyber-security requirements
and the actual development process so that the developers can
implement and verify solutions exactly.
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